This paper shows that economic conditions, as reflected in grain prices, helped determine rates of bachelorhood in northeast China from 1749 to 1909. For many rural populations, high grain prices are a useful measure of economic conditions because they typically indicate a poor harvest, leading to increased economic pressure and reduced consumption. Our analysis of 30,000 unmarried adult males in rural Liaodong from 1749-1909 indicate that while current grain prices did not affect marriage chances, prior grain prices twenty years previous did: boys born when grain prices were high were more likely to never marry than boys born under normal conditions. Results are consistent with an explanation in which increased incidence of female neglect or possibly infanticide when times were bad led to worsened sex imbalances in the marriage market two decades later.
Introduction
In late imperial China, bachelors were a perennial feature of an historic demographic system characterized by polygyny combined with female infanticide and neglect. 2 The proportion of men who never marry are often assumed to have increased during the eighteenth century and to have affected social stability. Sommer(2000) suggests that many eighteenth century developments in Qing law related to sex were a response to a rise in the number and perhaps proportion of males who were unable to marry. Similarly, Kuhn(1990) suggests that dramatic increases in the eighteenth century in the numbers of monks, beggars, and other itinerant unmarried males fueled public anxiety about outsiders and laid the groundwork for the panic over soulstealing that erupted in 1768. Increases in the proportion of men who never married may have threatened the state itself: the bandit gangs that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries ravaged the countryside and in some cases led uprisings typically recruited their members from the ranks of unmarried males. axiomatic, it has yet to be measured directly, let alone explained. While several studies have revealed that socioeconomic status and male marriage chances were associated in the cross-section, 4 to our knowledge there are no equivalents for China of studies like Lee(1981) and Galloway(1988) that have measured directly the influences of changes in living standards on male marriage chances in historical Europe. The primary empirical evidence consists of an observation that in results from several studies, it appears men married later or in lower proportions when living standards in China are generally believed to have been relatively poor. 5 Harrell suggested that bad times may have had an immediate effect by causing families to delay or forego the marriage of their sons, or a lagged effect by increasing female infanticide and neglect 6 and eventually worsening the sex imbalance in the marriage market.
This paper accordingly measures the influence of economic conditions on male first marriage in northeast China during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By applying event-history techniques to nominative, longitudinal household register data compiled in northeast China during the 18th and 19th centuries, we evaluate the roles of two mechanisms proposed in Harrell(1995) . If households responded to current economic conditions when making decisions about marriage for their sons, the chances of marriage should have declined immediately when times were bad. If economic conditions affected marriage via female infanticide and neglect, 7 adverse economic conditions should have reduced male marriage chances twenty years later, when the affected cohorts were old enough for their households to begin seeking spouses for them.
Understanding the link between economic conditions and male marriage in historical China may clarify the potential consequences of the current "missing girls" phenomenon. Recent increases in the sex ratio of births in China will lower the proportion of men who will be able to marry. 8 Theoretical and empirical work marriage markets raises the possibility that if the increase in sex ratios at birth is short-lived, adjustments in age preferences for spouses could soften the blow by distributing its impact over a large number of cohorts.
9 Whether this will happen is unclear because little or no empirical evidence exists on the responsiveness of age preferences in contemporary China to marriage market conditions. Economic conditions are a proxy for the sex ratio at birth in historical China because of their strong influence on rates of female infanticide and neglect, 10 thus measurement of their lagged effect on male marriage chances will provide insight into the flexibility of age preferences. Absence of a lagged effect would offer hope by indicating that at least in the past, age preferences were flexible enough to accommodate short-term variations in marriage market conditions. A strong lagged effect, in contrast, would suggest that preferences were rigid, and raise the possibility that a small number of cohorts will bear the brunt of the shortage of females.
The remainder of the paper is divided into five sections. The first section provides background on marriage in historical China, identifying key differences from Western Europe. The second section introduces the household register data. It explains how it was generated, describes its contents, and outlines its strengths and weaknesses for the analysis of male marriage. It also describes the grain price series used in the analysis. The third section describes the methods and models used in the analysis. After a brief introduction to the discrete-time event-history methods, it summarizes the patterns of results expected under the different hypothesized mechanisms linking economic conditions and marriage. The fourth section presents the results. The paper concludes with an assessment of the implications of the results for our understanding of the Chinese demographic system.
Background
The distinguishing features of marriage patterns in historical China are well known, and play a key role in most discussions of its demographic system.
11 Until the middle of the twentieth century, families arranged the marriages of their junior members and provided the necessary resources.
12 Almost all women married in their late teens or early twenties. 13 Even though widows were strongly discouraged from remarrying, it appears that some of those who were still in their twenties did so.
14 Patterns and practices for males were very different. While most of the men who married also did so in their late teens or early twenties, some married earlier or later. 15 There was pronounced inequality in access to marriage. While some men never married at all, many widowers remarried, and other men took concubines.
The asymmetry between male and female patterns was the result of a chronic shortage of potential brides. Female infanticide, 16 excess female mortality from childhood to early adulthood, 17 and strictures against widow but not widower remarriage meant that even though all women married, it was arithmetically impossible for all men to marry.
18 Ironically, shortages of females are now reemerging in China and other Asian societies because the recent availability of technology for identifying the sex of a fetus allows the use of abortion to prevent the birth of daughters.
19 One set of projections for China based on data from 1990 suggests that males eligible for first marriage will outnumber available females for much of the twenty-first century.
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Because the ages and proportions of women who married did not vary, any effect of economic conditions on marriage had to be on males. 21 Two mechanisms have been proposed, one direct and immediate, the other indirect and lagged. Adverse economic conditions may have had a direct and immediate effect by inducing households to delay or forego marriage for some or all of their sons. Empirical evidence already indicates that in the cross-section, men of higher socioeconomic status married earlier. 22 If this pattern had a longitudinal analogue, households with marriageable sons may not have had the resources needed for brideprice during bad times. Such a mechanism, if it existed, would be analogous to the marriage-based preventive check that Malthus claimed to play a key role in regulating population growth in historical England.
Many observers, however, doubt the existence of such a direct and immediate mechanism. Chao(1986), Tawney(1932) and others claim that in China, the primary role of the family in arranging the marriages of sons and providing the needed resources insulated marriage against economic variations. Indeed, indifference of marriage to economic conditions has been claimed to be a common characteristic of societies outside of Western Europe where marriage was a collective decision, not an individual one. 23 Malthus and his successors thought that the indifference of marriage to current economic conditions outside of Western Europe precluded the operation of the preventive check. According to this view, the positive check, mortality, was solely responsible for keeping population in balance with resources in collective societies such as China.
24
Economic conditions may also have had an indirect and lagged effect on male marriage. In late imperial China, bad times increased the incidence of female infanticide and neglect. 25 In a Chinese twist on the Easterlin(1978) hypothesis, the sex imbalance in the marriage market faced years later by men in the affected cohorts should have been especially severe. If households retained rigid preferences for the ages of their sons' brides in the face of an especially acute shortage of females, higher proportions of men from these cohorts should have remained unmarried.
The existence of a lagged mechanism is by no means guaranteed. If households had sufficiently flexible age preferences for their sons' spouses, the effects of a short-term increase in the sex ratio could have been distributed over enough cohorts that the proportion of men who remained bachelors remained nearly constant over time. 26 Families anticipating a shortage of females when their sons reached late adolescence or early adulthood could accelerate their marriages into childhood or early adolescence or delay their marriages into middle age. Previous results from Liaoning suggest that such strategies were feasible, since some men married in their early teens, their late twenties, or even their thirties.
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Assessing the importance of these two mechanisms has been impossible until now because available sources did not allow for direct measurement of the association between economic conditions and ages or proportions of males marrying. Lineage genealogies, until recently the most commonly used source for the study of Chinese historical demography, rarely recorded when or even whether lineage members married, only when they had sons who survived past childhood.
28
Thus while a number of studies of mortality and fertility in historical China have been carried out using lineage genealogies, 29 studies of time trends in male marriage have been few, and have relied on fatherhood as a proxy for marriage.
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Data
To analyze the association between economic conditions and male marriage in late imperial China, this paper uses household register data for hereditary tenants on state farms in Liaoning province during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These tenants are the descendants of Han Chinese settlers recruited from nearby Shandong province by the Qing(1644 Qing( -1911 Lee et al. 1992; Lee and Campbell 1997. 26 Bergstrom and Lam 1994. 27 Lee and Campbell 1997 . 28 Harrell 1987 . 29 Liu 1985 Telford 1990; Zhao 1994 . 30 Telford 1990 Telford , 1992 . 31 The region had been depopulated since the Manchus who had originally lived there moved to other parts of China after they conquering the country and founding the Qing dynasty in 1644.
the registers accounted for a substantial proportion of the population of this area. Thus while the population described by the registers is not representative of China as a whole, and perhaps not even of Liaoning, it is certainly representative of the inhabitants of a large region within Liaoning.
The household registers, known as the "Household and Population Registers of the Eight Banner Han Chinese Army"[Hanjun baqi rending hukouce], provide far more accurate demographic and sociological data than the baojia registers and lineage genealogies common elsewhere in China. 32 The quality of the Eight Banner data reflects the institutional context of the population. The Qing state relied heavily on the registers for civilian and military administration of the state farms and the tenants, and devised a remarkable system of internal crosschecks to ensure their consistency and accuracy. 33 Tracking of the population was further facilitated by tight restrictions on migration, not only to and from the region, but within the region as well. 34 The registers also provide more detailed data than most of the other sources used for the quantitative study of late imperial Chinese society and population. They record at three year intervals for each person in the target population the following information in order of appearance: relationship to their household head; name(s); adult banner status; age; physical disabilities, if any and if the person is an adult male; name of their kin-group head; banner affiliation; and village of residence.
35 Key events such as birth, death, marriage, immigration, or emigration are either recorded directly or can be inferred from comparison of successive entries. 36 For married women, the recorded name is almost always their maiden name. Individuals were listed one to a column in order of their relationship to the household head, with his children and grandchildren listed first, his coresident siblings and their descendants listed next, and then uncles, aunts, and cousins. Wives are always listed immediately after their husbands.
Ages were recorded in sui. Under the traditional Chinese system of reckoning age, individuals were one sui at the time of their birth. Their was incremented every Lunar New Year, not on their birthdays. On average, a Western
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Cameron CAMPBELL and James LEE 32 Harrell 1987; Jiang 1993; Lee and Campbell 1997:223-237; Skinner 1987; Telford 1986 Telford , 1990 33 First, they assigned every person in the banner population to a residential household [linghu] and registered them on a household certificate [menpai] . Then they organized households into clans [zu] , and compiled annually updated clan genealogies [zupu] . Every three years they compared these genealogies and household certificates with the previous register to compile a new register. They deleted and added people who had exited or entered in the last three years and updated the ages, relationships, and occupations of those people who remained. 34 Regimentation of the population actually began as early as 1625, when the Manchus made Shenyang their capital and incorporated the surrounding area into the banner system, Crossley 1997; Ding 1992; Elliott 2001. 35 Entries also include a lunar date of birth, including year, month, day, and hour, but previous investigation has revealed that these dates are reliable for only a small fraction of the observations, Lee and Campbell 1997. 36 Records of emigration identify whether it was legal or illegal. The individuals who departed from the area without permission were actually identified in the registers as "escapees" [taoding] . age can be approximated by subtracting 1.5 from the age in sui. Since a precise conversion to Western age requires knowing the month of birth, for this analysis the ages are left in sui. Age groups used in the construction of categorical variables are defined to approximate familiar Western age groupings. For example, the age group 11-15 sui corresponds roughly to 10-14 Western years.
The data analyzed here are extracted from a sample of registers that provide more than 600,000 observations of over 100,000 individuals who lived on 14 different state farms in Liaoning from the middle of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth. These tenants were distributed among approximately four hundred rural communities ranging in size from hamlets of only a few households to villages of several hundred households. Tables 1 and 2 The state farms in the sample were distributed into three separate areas in the northeast, center and southwest of Liaoning province. The northern region was hilly and remote. It remains inaccessible and poor even today. The communities in the central region were located on an agricultural plain just to the north of what is now the provincial capital, Shenyang. At the time, it was the administrative center for the region. The southern communities were on the Bohai Gulf coast and in the hinterland of Yingkou, a major port on the Liaodong peninsula. They were therefore relatively well-off, particularly from the middle of the nineteenth century onwards as Yingkou was a Second Opium War treaty port heavily involved in international trade. Previous descriptive results on demographic behavior confirms the impression of prosperity in the south: its tenants married the earliest, had the most children, and lived the longest.
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The state farms were not compact pieces of land. Instead, they were made up of collections of parcels that were sometimes scattered over a large area. As a result, the farms overlapped with each other and with other landholdings. Especially in the central and northern regions, there are a number of instances where tenants on different state farms lived together in the same communities.
Families acquired brides locally. Interviews with surviving elderly residents of the area reveal that until the middle of the twentieth century most brides came from within a few kilometers of their husband' s household. 39 Higher status families went somewhat further afield. In general, families acquired brides for their sons from families that were also associated with the Eight Banner system, most likely as hereditary tenants on the same or another state farm. According to interviews, intermarriage between the hereditary tenants on state land and freeholder families or tenants on private land was rare. Though freeholders, tenants on private land, and state tenants in the regions were all descended from Han Chinese settlers, the state tenants' institutional affiliation with the Eight Banner system gave them a special status.
The registers are a unique source for the study of male first marriage in China before the twentieth century. They record marital status for each individual in every register, and allow for individuals to be linked across registers, thus whether or not an unmarried male married in the three years between two registers can be inferred by comparing his marital status before and after. Accordingly, a dichotomous indicator variable may be constructed in each observation of an unmarried male indicating whether or not he marries by the time of the next register.
To be included in this analysis, an observation had to meet a number of criteria. Obviously, it had to be of a male who had not yet married. To ensure that no widowers were accidentally included in the analysis, analysis was further restricted to records of men who had been under observation from the time they were age 10 sui or younger. To ensure consistency in the meaning of the dependent variable, a dichotomous indicator of whether or not an individual married by the next available register, analysis was restricted to the registers for which the immediately succeeding one also existed. 40 The major limitation of the registers is that they do not identify precise dates of marriage, only the three year period within which a man married. The examination of the effects of current prices, therefore, is limited to measurement of the influence of average prices over the next three years on the chances of marrying in that time. An additional, though minor, shortcoming is that in the rare cases where a man married but his new wife died almost immediately, his marital status would appear unchanged from one register to the next, and there would be no evidence of the marriage.
For both substantive and practical reasons, this paper largely ignores female marriage except to present basic descriptive results on its age pattern. Substantively, female marriage was universal and age at marriage highly modal, thus there were no variations in either ages or proportions marrying to account for. Even if there was variation to account for, only the registers for two state farms, Daoyi and Guosantun, included records of appreciable numbers of daughters. In the remaining state farms, most females appeared in the registers only after they were married and in their husband' s household. Even in Daoyi and Guosantun the ratio of recorded sons to daughters was so high that there must have been living daughters who were not recorded in the registers. Moreover, the recording of daughters in those two state farms deteriorated substantially after 1840.
To measure economic conditions, we use grain price series from an empirewide system to monitor food availability that began elsewhere in China as early as the late seventeenth century and was extended to Liaoning into the late eighteenth century. 41 In this system, county magistrates reported each week the price of five major food grains(rice, wheat, husked and unhusked millet, soybean, and sorghum) to the provincial government. The governor, in turn, prepared a brief summary each month for the central government of the lowest and highest county prices by prefecture. Thus for each grain there is a "high" series and a "low" series, the former consisting of the highest reported prices, the latter consisting of the lowest reported prices. The lowest prices tended to be in rural producer areas, while the highest prices were in urban consumer areas such as Shenyang. To date 1500 monthly summary reports for Liaoning have been collected.
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Grain prices reflect conditions experienced by the tenants. In this region, they reflect climate and harvest yields more than market demand or state intervention, thus they are a proxy for tenants' grain production. 43 Since the tenants produced primarily for themselves or to pay in-kind rents to the state, and only bought or sold only a small portion of their harvest on the market, grain prices are also a proxy for food consumption. 44 That high prices reflected poor harvests and reduced consumption is confirmed by previous analyses of the region that have shown a positive correlation between death rates and prices and an inverse correlation between birth rates and prices.
45 Prices were also correlated with the incidence of female infanticide and neglect. 46 Sorghum was the most important crop in the region, thus its price is most appropriate as an indicator. Of the two sorghum price series, the low series is most relevant. As stated earlier it should have been more reflective of conditions in producer areas. Figure 1 summarizes sorghum prices during the period under consideration. They are clearly volatile. In some cases they could double or triple from one year to the next and then remain high for several consecutive years. Examination of available climate records indicates that many of the most prominent spikes were associated with extended spells of unfavorable weather such as cold summers.
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Methods Given the nature of the data, discrete-time event-history techniques are the most appropriate. 48 We estimate regressions in which the dependent variable is a transformation of the probability of marrying within the next three years. The complementary log-log transformation yields results most comparable to continuoustime methods. 49 In the actual data, the dependent variable is specified as a dichotomous indicator of whether or not a male marries in the next three years. Estimated coefficients bn reflects the effect on the chances of marrying in the next three years of a one unit change in the associated independent variable, holding the values of the other independent variables equal.
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To investigate whether current economic conditions had a direct and immediate impact on marriage chances, models include "low" sorghum prices averaged over the next three years. To the extent that families delayed marriage for their sons during times of economic crisis, increases in the price of grain should
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Economic Conditions and Male First Marriage in Northeast China, 1749-1909 43 Lee and Campbell 1997:31-35 . 44 Even if tenants were heavily involved in the market, results on historical Europe suggest that they would not have benefitted from high prices, because the inverse correlation between production and prices was strong enough that for small producers the benefits of being able to sell at a higher price were typically offset by the drawbacks of having less to sell, Galloway, 1988. 45 Lee and Campbell 1997 . 46 Lee et al. 1992 . 47 Lee and Campbell 1997 . 48 Allison 1984; Yamaguchi 1991 . 49 Long 1997. 50 Standard errors for the estimated coefficients are robust, in the sense that they are adjusted have reduced the chances of marrying. An absence of an association between prices and the chances of marriage, meanwhile, would have at least two interpretations. On the one hand, households may have had access to sufficient resources that they could ignore the effects of short-term economic fluctuations when it came to decisions about marriage. This would be in line with the common notion that the Chinese family system, by allowing families hoping to acquire spouses for their sons to draw upon the resources of the entire extended family, allowed families to ignore short-term conditions. 51 On the other hand, it may have been that the net effects of price increases on marriage were small because the increased difficulty paying brideprice faced by families with sons was offset by a heightened eagerness of families with daughters to reduce expenses by marrying them off.
To examine whether there was a delayed influence of economic conditions on marriage that operated through female infanticide or neglect, the models also include a nine-year moving average of sorghum prices lagged by twenty years. The lagged moving average is appropriate as an indicator of the supply of marriageable women because female infanticide and neglect increased when grain prices were high 52 and almost all women married between ages 16 and 25 sui. 53 Conditions more than twenty-five years previous were irrelevant because women from those cohorts all would have married, and if already widowed would be unlikely to remarry. More recent conditions are also unimportant because in the state farms, there are very few recorded marriages where the bride is less than 16 sui.
Interpretation of possible responses is straightforward. An association between lagged prices and the chances of marrying would confirm that increased use of female infanticide when times were bad worsened the shortage of potential brides faced by families with sons sixteen to twenty four years later. A lack of an association with lagged prices would indicate that the claims of an association between prices and female infanticide in Lee et al.(1992) were incorrect. This would be the case if the parents who registered their daughters were much more sensitive to prices than the parents who failed to register their daughters, or if the chances of registering a daughter depended on economic conditions in the year in which she was born.
To test whether families could adjusted to fluctuations in the supply of women by accelerating or delaying the marriage of their sons, a final model is estimated in which sorghum prices twenty years previous are replaced with a nineyear moving average of prices centered on the year in which the male at risk was born. Such a model measures the net effects on males born in bad times of facing a worsened shortage of females when they are at the modal ages of male marriage. If families successfully accommodated anticipated or experienced shortages of unmarried females by acquiring brides for their sons when they were very young or very old, the men born when prices were high should have had increased chances of marrying in their teens or their thirties, and reduced chances of marrying while in their twenties. Price effects are allowed to vary with age through the introduction of interaction terms. For both current and lagged prices, three interaction terms are included, one for each ten year age group between 11 and 40 sui. This accounts for the possibility that men marrying at different ages were drawn from different strata of the population. The men who married earlier were likely to be of higher socioeconomic status, 54 thus their marriage chances were least likely to be affected by changing conditions in the marriage market. The men who married later, meanwhile, were of lower socioeconomic status. Such men encountered difficulty marrying even when times were good, thus they should have been affected the most by a shortage of unmarried females.
To account for differences between the three regions, thus in addition to the model for all three regions combined there are separate models for each. As noted earlier, the geographic and economic contexts of the three regions differed substantially. According to calculations not shown here, their marriage patterns did as well. Men in the relatively prosperous southern region were not only more likely to marry than their counterparts in the central and northern regions, they did so at earlier ages. Of course, comparison of the results for the three regions also helps assess the robustness of results. If these three very different regions had a common response to changing economic conditions, the claim that they may have been typical of other parts of China may seem more plausible.
Year of birth is entered as a set of three interactions with dichotomous indicators for age group 11-20, 21-30 and 31-40 sui. These account for secular trends in the chances of marrying at different ages. Previous analysis has revealed that the chances of marrying while young rose steadily, while those who remained unmarried at later ages were progressively less likely to ever marry. 55 To assess the overall extent of families' success at compensating for shortages of brides in specific cohorts, coefficients are translated into predicted probabilities of remaining unmarried at different ages. For different sorghum prices around time of birth, age-specific predicted probabilities of marrying in the next three years were obtained for male cohorts by setting dichotomous indicator variables appropriately and continuous variables other than prices around time of birth to their means. These age-specific probabilities were chained together to estimate the proportions of men remaining unmarried at ages 21, 31 and 41 sui. If families were successful in their efforts to compensate by a shortage of women in particular cohorts by acquiring brides from adjoining cohorts, the probability of remaining unmarried at age 41 sui should have been unaffected by prices at time of birth, even if age-specific probabilities of marrying were sensitive. This section is organized into three parts. The first provides relevant background on marriage patterns and trends, along with a demonstration of the greater sensitivity of female births to economic conditions. The second presents results from models of first male marriage in which the right-hand side variables are current prices and prices 20 years previous. The third part presents results from the models in which the right-hand side variables are current prices and prices around time of birth. It includes probabilities of remaining unmarried at different ages under different scenarios.
Results
The supply of females eligible for first marriage consisted almost entirely of women in their late teens and early twenties. Figure 1 presents life table proportions of sons and daughters remaining unmarried at each age from 1 to 41 sui calculated from age-specific probabilities of marriage in the next three years. According to the figures for daughters, which are based largely on data from Daoyi and Guosantun, only 10 percent of women married by age 15 sui, but 90 percent were married by the time they were 26 sui. 80 percent, in other words, married between ages 15 and 26 sui. By contrast, males could marry for the first time at almost any age from 6 sui on. They were most likely to marry between ages 11 and 30 sui.
Examination of spouses' ages in new couples where the husband was marrying for the first time yields additional evidence that most brides were in their late teens or early twenties. th and 95 th percentiles of wife' s age according to husband' s age at marriage. 56 Since this calculation relies on information about men and women who are married, it makes use of data from all state farms, not just Daoyi and Guosantun. According to the result, no matter how old a male was when he married, he was overwhelmingly likely to marry a female in her late teens or early twenties. The sole exception was that men who married late, that is in their thirties, appear to have been more likely to have wives who were in their thirties or late twenties. Since there is no information on these wives' experiences before they married, the possibility can not be ruled out that many of them were actually young widows who were remarrying.
When families seeking brides for their sons faced a shortage of eligible females, their options for compensating by acquiring brides from other birth cohorts or more distant villages appear to have been limited. Figure 3 plots raw and kernel smoothed proportions of men aged 11-20, 21-30, and 31-40 sui ever married from successive birth cohorts. If families could compensate for shortfalls in particular female birth cohorts by loosening their preferences for brides of a particular age, social background, or origin location, the percentage of males marrying should have varied little from one birth cohort to the next. According to Figure 3 , however, adjacent male birth cohorts varied in the chances that their members would ever marry. It was not uncommon for men born in successive years to differ by several percentage points in the chances of marrying by the time they were aged 31-40 sui. Sustained peaks and troughs are also apparent.
Variations in the supply of females may have been partly attributable to economic fluctuations, since families in Liaoning increased their use of female infanticide or fatal neglect when times were bad.
57 Table 3 replicates earlier findings on associations between economic conditions and reproduction by presenting separate regressions of the chances that currently married women in Daoyi and Guosantun would have registered male and female births. 58 In both cases, the lefthand side variable is an indicator of whether or not a currently married woman has a registered birth in the corresponding year. According to the results, a ten percent increase in sorghum prices reduced the chances of having a male birth by 0.6 percent, and the chances of having a female birth by 1.1 percent. The difference between the male and female responses is not trivial, since Figure 1 indicates that far larger price increases were common. A tripling of sorghum prices like the one in the early 1790s would have reduced the number of male births by 6.7 percent, and the number of female births by 11.9 percent. Economic conditions clearly affected male marriage chances two decades later. Table 4 presents results from an analysis of the effects of current and lagged sorghum prices on the chances of marrying in the next three years. According to the results for the first model, which included data from all three regions, a ten percent increase in sorghum prices twenty years ago reduced the chances of marrying in the next three years by 3.0 percent for males aged 21-30 sui, and 6.5 percent for males aged 31-40 sui. Tripling prices, in other words, would reduce the chances that a male aged 31-40 sui would marry by roughly one-half. Adverse consequences of lagged sorghum prices were apparent in all three regions, although the age pattern of effects varied. In the north and central regions, men aged 21-30 sui and 31-40 sui tended to see their chances of marrying fall. Marriage at earlier ages was not affected because the men who married earlier in these regions were from wealthy or high status families that had the resources to acquire brides even when there was a shortage of females. In the prosperous southern region, it was men aged 11-20 who were affected. Early marriage was far more common in the south than in the other regions, thus the families that acquired brides for young sons were more representative of families overall, and included many that could not compete for brides in a tight market.
The most plausible explanation for the consistent and strong effect lagged sorghum prices on male marriage chances, of course, is that they affected the incidence of female infanticide and fatal neglect and eventually the supply of unmarried but eligible females. Table 3 already showed that in Daoyi and Guosantun, rising sorghum prices reduced female births more than male births, most likely because they increased female infant mortality more than they increased male infant mortality. Calculations not shown here do not reveal any effects of economic conditions around time of birth on male or female death rates in childhood, adolescence, or early adulthood, thus lagged effects of early-life conditions on mortality are unlikely to have contributed to sex imbalances among eligible males and females. Previous work has shown that after infancy, male mortality was more sensitiveto sorghum prices than female mortality, 59 thus effects of lagged prices can not be attributed to a correlation with prices in intervening years.
The received wisdom that Chinese families ignored current economic conditions when acquiring brides for their sons, 60 meanwhile, appears to be largely correct for Liaoning. There is almost no evidence in the results for current 58 This calculation was performed on a special file of annual observations of women generated by merging triennial observations of married women with annual records of the births attributed to them. A registered birth was one that survives long enough to make at least one appearance in a register, usually between ages 1 and 6 sui. Information on boys and girls who died before they were listed in a register are not available, thus this calculation omits children who died in infancy and early childhood. Even in Daoyi and Guosantun, many daughters were never listed in a register if they did survive, thus the numbers of surviving female births are underestimated as well. Analysis was restricted to the years before 1840 because the recording of daughters was especially poor in later years, Lee and Campbell 1997. 59 Lee 1996, 2000b . 60 Tawney 1932; Chao 1986. sorghum prices in table 4 that the chances of marrying in the next three years fell when sorghum prices rose. The sole exception is that in the northern state farms, there is some suggestion that when prices rose, men were less likely to marry early. While the overall lack of an effect of current prices might indeed mean that the availability of resources from the extended family reduced dependence on current conditions, it may also mean that the reduced ability of families with sons to put together brideprice or indirect dowry was offset by an increased willingness on the part of families with daughters to reduce consumption by marrying them off. Families seeking to compensate for an anticipated or experienced shortage of females by speeding up or delaying the marriage of their sons had only limited success. Families, in other words, could not obtain brides by relaxing preferences for the age or other characteristics of a bride. Table 5 presents results from models in which prices twenty years ago have been replaced by prices around the time of a male' s birth. Only in the northern region was there any evidence that being born when prices were high increased the chances that a male would marry while still relatively young. In the remaining regions and at other ages, being born when prices were high either had no statistically significant effect on the chances of marrying, or else reduced its likelihood. Men unfortunate enough to be born when sorghum prices were high accordingly were at increased risk of never marrying at all. Table 6 presents predicted probabilities of remaining unmarried at different ages according to average sorghum prices around time of birth, based on the results in table 5. 61 According to the results for all regions combined, men born in periods when sorghum prices were at their highest were almost 50 percent more likely to never marry than men born when periods were at their lowest. Effects were especially pronounced in the south, where the chances of marrying by age 21 sui fell by one-half, and the chances of not marrying at all tripled. Thus even though men born when prices were low achieved almost universal marriage, with only 3.8 percent remaining unmarried at age 41 sui, more than 10 percent of men born when prices were at their highest would never marry.
Conclusion
This paper has demonstrated that economic conditions influenced marriage behavior in Liaoning, China, but that the underlying mechanism was very different from that claimed for historical Western Europe. The received wisdom about the lack of influence of current economic conditions on marriage chances 62 appears to have been largely correct. For whatever reason, families seeking brides for their sons were largely indifferent to short-term variations in the standard of living, as reflected in sorghum prices. Whether prices rose or fell, men married at the roughly same rate. This is of course very different from Western Europe, where according to Malthus and others, prudent men and women timed their marriage according to their individual economic circumstances. Since individual economic circumstances depended at least partially on aggregate conditions, this provided a mechanism for balancing population growth with available resources.
In Liaoning, economic conditions affected marriage, but there was a two decade lag between cause and effect. When grain prices rose, families responded in the short term with increased use of female infanticide and fatal neglect, not delayed marriage for their sons. Years later, when females in the affected cohorts reached ages at which they were eligible to marry, there were too few of them, and increased proportions of males remained unmarried. Effects were apparent in three regions of Liaoning with widely differing economic contexts. Because there was an overall shortage of females, families seeking brides for their sons appear to have been unable to compensate by relaxing preferences with respect to age, geographic location, or other characteristics.
Accordingly, there was yet another preventive check to population growth in China. It has already been argued that, contrary to the claims of Malthus and others, the preventive check operated in historical China in the form of deliberate fertility control by married couples. 63 The results here indicate that the exercise of infanticide when times were bad, normally an example of the positive check, led over the long term to the operation of a preventive check, in the form of high proportions of males remaining unmarried. Female infanticide, in other words, not only had a direct effect on population growth rates, 64 but also had an indirect effect, by reducing the capacity of males in the affected cohorts to reproduce.
There accordingly appears to be historical precedent for contemporary concern that recent imbalances in the sex ratio of registered births in China and elsewhere may translate into increases in the proportions of men who are unable to marry. 65 Whether it was because families refused to relax preferences for the characteristics of brides when females were in short supply, or because the overall shortage of females meant that nothing could be achieved with relaxed preferences, it appears that one of the major responses in the Chinese marriage system to a fluctuation in the supply of females was to vary the proportion of men who would ever marry. 
